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VOLUME XIX APRIL, 1944 NUIBER 2
The four leading articles included in this issue are ad-
dresses which were delivered before the Legal Institute of the
Seattle Bar Association held at the University of Washington
Law School on April 7, 1944. We regret that the fine address
given by Mr. Frank P. Keenan, Special Assistant to the Attorney
General of the United States on the subject of "Federal Eminent
Domain" had to be omitted because it was not available in manu-
script form.-EDIToR.
FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION AND THE WIENER CASE*
By GEORGE DONWORTH
On February 28, 1944, the Supreme Court of the United States by
a six to three decision dismissed -for want of jurisdiction the case of
Flournoy, Sheriff and Ex-Officio Tax Collector of Caddo Parish,
Louisiana, against Samuel G. Wiener and others. The majority opinion
was written by Chief Justice Stone, and there was a dissenting opinion
by Justice Frankfurter in which Justices Roberts and Jackson concur-
red. The dismissal naturally carries no intimation of the views of the
Justices on the merits of the case which 'involved constitutional points
of much importance, especially to property owners in the states
where the community property system prevails. The story of the
case requires a reference to the statutes of the United States relating
to taxation of estates of deceased persons.
Section 810 of the United States Revenue Code, originally a part
of the Revenue Act of 1926, enacts that "a tax equal to the sum of
the following percentages of the value of the net estate (determined as
provided in Section 812) shall be imposed upon the transfer of the net
estate of every decedent, citizen or resident of the United States, dying
after the date of the enactment of this title."
Sections 811 and 811(a) enact that "the value of the gross estate of
the decedent, shall be determined by including the value at the time
* A paper read before the Legal Institute-of the Seattle Bar Association,
April 7, 1944.
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of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible,
wherever situated, except real property situated outside of the United
States, (a) to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at
the time of his death."
By Section 813 (b) it is enacted that the tax imposed by the Act of
1926 shall be credited with the amount of any estate, inheritance,
legacy, or succession taxes actually paid to any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, or any possession of the United States, in
respect of any property included in the gross estate, with a proviso
that the credit allowed by this Subsection shall not exceed 80 per
centum of the tax imposed by Section 810.
A majority of the states have taken advantage of this credit to the
full extent permitted by enacting what have come to be called "take-up
statutes" of which the law of the State of Washington, Section 11,202-
(B) of Rem. Rev. Stat., is typical. By that section the legislature of
this state has enacted that "where the tax imposed by the inheritance
tax laws of the State of Washington is of a lesser amount than the
maximum credit of eighty per cent of the federal estate tax allowed
by the federal estate tax act, then the tax provided for by the said
inheritance tax laws of the State of Washington shall be increased so
that the amount of tax due the State of Washington shall be the
maximum amount of the credit allowed under said federal estate tax
act." And it is directed that the additional estate tax shall be paid
as any ordinary charge against the estate.
By the Federal 1926 Act a sliding scale of the rate of taxation is
fixed and certain deductions and exemptions are allowed. The tax
imposed by the 1926 Act is known as the "federal basic tax."
By the Revenue Act of 1932 Congress enacted an additional estate
tax which in turn prescribed a sliding scale of rates for the additional
tax and fixed a lesser amount for the exemption. The rate thus pre-
scribed begins at 3 per cent of the net estate and reaches as high as
77 per cent in the highest bracket. There is a specific provision to the
effect that in the case of this additional estate tax, there shall be no
credit or deduction for taxes levied by the states. Therefore, the
80 per cent credit clause and the several "take-up" statutes have no
reference to the additional federal estate tax.
It is a principle common to all states having the community system
that the community property is in the nature of partnership property.
owned jointly and in equal interests by the husband and the wife,
the community being a species of partnership akin in many respects to
the business partnerships existing in other states. In all community
property states the state inheritance tax laws have recognized the
equal ownership of the wife and on the death of either spouse only an
undivided one-half interest in the community property is the subject
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of an estate or inheritance tax. The Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, the Attorneys General of the United States and the courts have
constantly recognized that on the death of either spouse only the
half interest in the community property owned by the decedent, as
determined by state laws, is subject to the federal estate transfer tax
or is included in the estate valuation.
This proposition is so clear in the State of Washington that there
have been but few decisions directly on the point, but the Inheritance
Tax Department of the state has consistently ruled to that effect.
The established ruling by all the federal authorities has been to the
same effect in administering federal estate taxation. Prior to the
enactment of the Revenue Act of 1942, hereinafter described, the
United States never attempted to levy an estate tax upon the interest
of the surviving husband or wife in community property or to include
more than one-half of the community property in the valuation of the
estate taxed. Obviously, this is for the reason that there is no transfer
of title as to the one-half of community property held by the surviving
husband or wife, the survivor holding by the continuation of an existing
title. Prior to October, 1942, the rulings of the Treasury Department
and the Internal Revenue Bureau on this point have been consistent
and uniform. As typical of the various rulings, see General Counsel's
Memorandum No. 7773 in the matter of an estate in Texas (August,
1930) wherein it is stated (in a case where the wife elected to take
under the provisions of the will instead of retaining her statutory com-
munity interest):
"it is the opinion of this office that the value of B's interest in
the community property is not a part of A's gross estate
within the purview * * * * of the Revenue Act of 1926, not-
withstanding the fact that she elected to take under the will."
The general counsel then cites United States District Court cases
arising in Texas and says:
"In each of those cases, the Court held without written
opinion that the interest of the wife in the community estate
was not a part of her deceased husband's gross estate. The
government did not appeal from those decisions."
This ruling is merely illustrative of the long continued and undis-
puted interpretation of the federal estate tax law.
Also for more than twenty years the federal income tax law has
been administered with full recognition of the community property
status in the states where that system of law has been enacted by the
respective state legislatures. By court decisions and by administrative
regulations and rulings, husbands and wives in the community property
states have customarily filed separate returns in each year, each
spouse returning for federal income tax purposes one-half of the com-
munity income in addition to the separate income (if any) of the
1944]
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reporting spouse. This interpretation of the income tax act has been
upheld in repeated decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States
and other courts. Some of those cases are mentioned later in this
paper. That authoritative interpretation remains in full force and
effect. In the matter of the federal estate tax and the federal gilt tax,
however, the community property system is under attack.
By the Revenue Act of 1942, which took effect October 21, 1942,
Congress made a number of changes in the federal estate tax law in
derogation of recognition formerly given to the community property
laws of the states where that system prevails. By Section 402(b) (2)
of the 1942 act, Section 811 of the Internal Revenue Code was amended
by inserting at the end thereof a new paragraph, now Section
811(e) (2), requiring the valuation of the gross estate of the decedent
to include in certain cases the value of property never owned by the
decedent, as follows:
"(2) Community Interests-To the extent of the interest
therein held as community property by the decedent and sur-
viving spouse under the law of any state, territory, or posses-
sion of the United States, or any foreign country, except such
part thereof as may be shown to have been received as com-
pensation for personal services actually rendered by the sur-
viving spouse or derived originally from such compensation
or from separate property of the surviving spouse. In no case
shall such interest included in the gross estate of the decedent
be less than the value of such part of the community property
as was subject to the decedent's power of testamentary dis-
position."
The foregoing paragraph has effect chiefly with reference to the
valuation of the taxed estate. The matter of the imposition of a per-
sonal liability for the tax is covered by Section 411(a) of the same
act, whereby Section 827 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code is amended
to read as follows (omitting the words relating to powers of appoint-
ment, which are not germane to this discussion):
"(a) Imposition of liability. Section 827(b) is amended
to read as follows:
"'(b) Liability of transferee, etc. If the tax herein imposed
is not paid when due, then the spouse, transferee, trustee,
surviving tenant, * * * * * or beneficiary, who receives, or
has on the date of the decedent's death, property included in
the gross estate under section 811(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), or
(g), to the extent of the value, at the time of the decedent's
death, of such property, shall be personally liable for such tax.
Any part of such property sold by such spouse, transferee,
trustee, surviving tenant, * * * or beneficiary, to a bona fide
purchaser for. an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth shall be divested of the lien provided in Section
827(a) and a like lien shall then attach to all the property of
such spouse, transferee, trustee, surviving tenant, person in
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possession, or beneficiary, except any part sold to a bona fide
purchaser for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth.'"
Another section of the Revenue Act of 1942 in derogation of com-
munity property rights is Section 453, whereby all gifts of community
property are declared to be gifts of the husband, except where traceable
to compensation for personal services actually rendered by the wife
or made from the separate property of the wife. Still another section
of the new act having a similar purpose is Section 404(g) (4), whereby
it is decreed that premiums on life insurance paid with property held
as community property by- the insured and surviving spouse shall
be considered to have been paid by the insured.
In December, 1942, some six weeks after the enactment of the
Revenue Act of 1942, Sam Wiener, Jr., died at Shreveport, La. At
the time of his death he and his wife held interests in community
property acquired chiefly through the husband's earnings during their
marriage. Upon his death, under Louisiana law, one-half of the net
community property remaining after the payments of debts and
charges, belonged to the surviving wife by the continuing title by which
she was the owner of that one-half at all times from its acquisition by
the community. The Wiener will recognized the wife's community half
interest and left the husband's half interest to three of his sons.
Wiener and wife were residents and citizens of Louisiana and were
married in that state in 1907. The community estate was valued, after
debts, succession charges and taxes, at more than $600,000. The three
'sons (referred to in Louisiana as the universal legatees and heirs)
brought suit in an appropriate proceeding in the local court of the Parish
of Caddo, Louisiana, asking the court to fix the inheritance taxes due
that state, both under the original inheritance tax law of the state
and the "take-up statute" imposing the further state tax as the minimum
80 per cent of the basic federal tax. The suit was in the nature of a
declaratory judgment suit by the three sons against Flournoy in his
official capacity as state tax collector. The tax collector contended that
since the Federal Revenue Act of 1942 directed that all of the com-
munity property be included in the gross estate of the decedent, the
80 per cent take-up clause required the inclusion of the total community
property in the valuation on which the state's 80 per cent would be
computed. The tax collector accordingly contended that $14,330.90
was due the State of Louisiana rather than $8,224.09 which would
have been the amount due to the state if the valuation for the federal
estate tax had not been increased by including the value of the total
community estate.
It is my understanding that neither the executor nor the heirs or
legatees of Wiener had filed a federal estate tax return. Neither the
1944]
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United States nor the Commissioner of Internal Revenue nor the local
Federal Collector of Internal Revenue was a party to the action. It
could be claimed (and in substance and in effect was claimed by the
assistant attorney general of the United States in the briefs which he
filed in behalf of the United States as friend of the court) that the
new provisions found in the 1942 Revenue Act were not directly in-
volved and that those new provisions were merely of interest insofar
as they furnished a measuring rod for the ascertainment of the tax
imposed by the "take-up statute" of Louisiana, a purely state question.
In the local Parish Court in Louisiana, the Wieners prevailed. The
tax collector took an appeal to the Supreme Court of the state, which
affirmed the judgment below, despite a brief filed in behalf of the
United States asserting the contrary view.
The decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court, filed June 21, 1943,
is reported in 14 South. (2d) 475. That court declared Section 402(b)
(2) of the Revenue Act of 1942 to be unconstitutional as a federal
enactment because it violated the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. It further held that the Louisiana take-up 80
per cent statute, if construed to require the inclusion in the valuation
of Wiener's gross estate of the half of the community belonging to the
wife, violated the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States. The court said:
"It is obvious, therefore, that the wife's interest in the com-
munity property in Louisiana does not spring from any fiction
of the law or from any gift or act of generosity on the part
of her husband but, instead, from an express legal contract of
partnership entered into at the time of the marriage. There is
no substantial difference between her interest therein and the
interest of an ordinary member of a limited or ordinary part-
nership, the control and management of whose affairs has, by
agreement, been entrusted to a managing partner. The only
real difference is that the limitations placed on the managing
partner in the community partnership are fixed by law, while
those placed on the managing partner in an ordinary or limited
partnership are fixed by convention or contract."
From the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court, Flournoy, the
tax collector, appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. In
that court six briefs were filed. Those briefs consisted of: (a) the
original and reply briefs of the appellant tax collector; (b) the brief
of the appellees, the Wieners; (c) the brief for the United States filed
by the solicitor general and assistant attorney general of the United
States as amici curiae; (d) the brief as amici curiae filed by 13 mem-
bers of the bar, representing the Louisiana State Bar Association and
the Louisiana Community Property Taxpayers Committee, the Wash-
ington State Bar Association and the Committee of Community Prop-
erty Taxpayers of the State of Washington, the State Bar of Texas,
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the State Bar of California, the State Bar of Arizona and the Idaho
State Bar. Commission; and (e) the brief filed by the attorneys general
of the States of California, Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas
and Washington and the chief counsel of the Oklahoma Tax Com-
mission.
The briefs of the appellant tax collector and the brief of the United
States argued in support of the constitutionality of the federal enact-
ment in question. The United States brief also urged the court not
to accept jurisdiction of the case. All the other briefs attacked the
federal enactment as being in violation of the Constitution of the
United States. 4
As we are not concerned at this time with any attempt to have the
Supreme Court of the United States reconsider the judgment of dis-
missal, I discuss here only the validity of the federal enactment in
question under the legislative powers of Congress. I note, however, in
passing that the majority opinion written by Chief justice Stone, di-
recting the dismissal of the appeal, uses the following language:
"The only tax here sought to be imposed is the state in-
heritance tax authorized by Act No. 119. The state court
having held that that Act is either inapplicable or, if applica-
ble, is an infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment, any
ruling we could make as to the validity of Sec. 402(b) (2)
could afford no basis for affirming, modifying or setting aside
the decision of the state court that by reason of the inval-
idity or inapplicability of Act. No. 119, the tax demanded
cannot be imposed. * * * Hence the case stands in the same
posture as those in which we have repeatedly held that where
the judgment of a state court rests in part on a non-federal
ground adequate to support it, this Court will not consider the
correctness of the decision which the state court also made of
a federal question otherwise reviewable here."
Naturally it was the briefs of the actual parties to the case, appellant
and appellees, and the appellant's assignments of error that presented
the vital questions on which the jurisdiction of the court depended.
The briefs of the several amici curiae, however enlightening or elucidat-
ing, could not enlarge the jurisdiction of the court.
The validity, as a federal enactment of Section 402(b) (2), is of
vital importance to property owners in all the community property
states. It is reassuring to know that by the briefs filed, the attorney
general of the State of Washington and the State Bar Association of the
State of Washington, along with the attorneys general and bar asso-
ciations of other community property states, have gone on record in
the strongest possible terms in asserting the unconstitutionality of the
federal enactment in question.
Let us proceed now to review the reasons supporting the proposition
that the enactment is unconstitutional. In this discussion, so far as
1944]
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state laws are concerned, I shall refer principally to the community
property law of the State of Washington, knowing that the lawyers
that I am addressing are interested chiefly from that point of view. As
is well known, the laws of the other community property states are
sufficiently like ours to furnish substantial parallels.
It is submitted that the following propositions are sound law:
1. IT IS A FUNDAMENTAL HOLDING OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT THAT, AS A MATTER OF SETTLED POLICY, IT WILL FOLLOW
the STATE DECISIONS INTERPRETING STATE LAWS GOVERNING
PROPERTY AND PROPERTY RIGHTS, ALSO THAT THE WHOLE SUB-
JECT OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE BELONGS
TO THE LAWS OF THE SEVERAL STATES AND NOT TO THE LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES.
In Warburton v. White (176 U. S. 484, 496), this rule is enunciated
in the following language:
"Where the state decisions have interpreted state laws
governing real property or controlling relations which are
essentially of a domestic and state nature, in other words,
where the state decisions establish a rule of property, this
court when called upon to interpret the state law will, if it is
possible to do so, in the discharge of its duty, adopt and
follow the settled rule of construction affixed by the state
court of last resort to the statute of the state, and thus
conform to the rule of property within the state."
To the same effect are the following cases: DeVaughn v. Hutchinson
(165 U. S. 566); United States v. Crosby (7 Cranch. 115); Middle-
ton v. McGrew (23 Howard 45); Lippincott v. Mitchell (94 U. S.
767); Washington v. Miller (235 U. S. 422); Buchser v. Buchser
(231 U. S. 157); Elnendorf v. Taylor (10 Wheat. 152, 159); Hines
Yellow Pines Trustees v. Martin (268 U. S. 458, 464); Knights v.
Meyer (265 U. S. 30); Bucher v. Cheshire R. R. Co. (125 U. S. 555);
Burgess v. Seligman (107 U. S. 20, 27).
In Ohio v. Agler (280 U. S. 379), the Supreme Court said:
"It has been understood that 'the whole subject of the
domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child,
belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of the
United States.' (Re Burns, 136 U. S. 586, 593, 594.)"
In the opinion of the United States attorney general, rendered as
long ago as February 26, 1921 (32 Op. Attys. Gen. 435), the attorney
general said:
"In Warburton v. White (176 U. S. 484, 496) the principle
was enunciated that where state decisions have interpreted
state laws governing property or controlling relations that are
essentially of a domestic and state nature the United States
Supreme Court will follow the state decisions if possible to do
so, in the discharge of its duties. Also in DeVaughm v.
Hutchinson (156 U. S. 566, 570) it was held that to the
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law of the state in which property is situated we must look
for the rules which govern its descent, alienation, and transfer,
and for the effect and construction of wills and other convey-
ances. In United States v. Crosby (7 Cranch. 155) it was
held that the title to land can be acquired and lost only in
the manner prescribed by the law of the place where the
same is situated."
2. THERE IS NO COMMON LAW OF THE UNITED STATES. THERE Is
No SUCH THING AS A NATIONAL SYSTEM OF THE "LAw OF HUSBAND
AND WIFE OR OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF HUSBAND AND
WIFE. THE LAWS OF EACH STATE MUST BE LOOKED TO TO DE-
TERMINE ANY QUESTION OF THAT CHARACTER.
There is no common law of the United States, in the sense of a
national customary law, distinct from the common law, as adopted by
the several states, each for itself, applied as its local law, and subject to
such alteration as may be provided by its own statutes. Smith v. Ala-
bama (124 U. S. 465). In that case, the same court said:
"It has never been doubted but that this entire body and
system of law, regulating in general the relative rights and
duties of persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the
state, without regard to their pursuits, is subject to change
at the will of the legislature of each state, except as that will
may be restrained by the Constitution of the United States.
It is to this law that persons within the scope of its operation
look for the definition of their rights and for the redress of
wrongs committed upon them. It is the source of all those
relative obligations and duties enforceable by law, the ob-
servance of which the state undertakes to enforce as its
public policy. And it was in contemplation of the continued
existence of this separate system of law in each state that
the Constitution of the United States was framed and ordained
with such legislative powers as are therein granted expressly
or by reasonable implication."
3. THE WASHINGTON STATUTES DEFINING AND REGULATING COM-
MUNITY PROPERTY ARE CLEAR AND ARE CONCLUSIVE ON THE PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS RESULTING FROM THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT.
With the exception of property owned by the spouses before mar-
riage and that acquired afterwards by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance
and the rents, issues and profits thereof, all property acquired after
marriage in any manner whatsoever by either husband or wife, or both,
is community property. Rem. Rev. Stat., Sections 6890, 6891 and
6892.
In Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309, the Washington Court said
that the husband's powers with relation to community property are no
broader than those employed in general powers of attorney; that the
husband is a mere staiutory agent for the community; -and that
there is an absolute equality of ownership and rights in all community
1944)
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property, both real and personal, there being no distinction whatever
so far as concerns the equal property interests of husband and wife.
In Marston v. Rue, 92 Wash. 129, the court decreed the husband to
be only the head of the family and that the personal property is as
much the wife's as the husband's and that her property right is as
great as his.
Other cases establishing the wife's equal ownership with the
husband of community property are too numerous to cite. I call atten-
tion to a few.
Stewart v. Bank of Endicott, 82 Wash. 106 (holding that
the purpose of giving the management and control of the com-
munity personal property to the husband is to facilitate the
business of the community)
McDonough v. Craig, 10 Wash. 239
Spinning v. Allen, 10 Wash. 570
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Clark, 144 Wash. 520
Mabie v. Whittaker, 10 Wash. 656 (holding that the title of
the wife is not an equitable one only, but is a legal title equal
to that of the husband)
Schneider v. Biberger, 76 Wash. 504
Parker v. Parker, 121 Wash. 24
Olive Co. v. Meek, 103 Wash. 467
Bortle v. Osborne, 155 Wash. 585 (holding that the com-
munity is not a distinct entity or juristic person and that all
community property is owned by both spouses equally)
Huyvaerts v. Roedtz, 105 Wash. 657
Wampler v. Beinert, 125 Wash. 494 (holding that the pur-
pose of the statute giving the husband management and con-
trol of the community personal property is only for the
purpose of facilitating the business of the community)
4. THE ACTUAL AND DIRECT OWNERSHIP OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
IN EQUAL SHARES BY THE HUSBAND AND BY THE WIFE HAS BEEN
DIRECTLY ADJUDICATED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY INCOME TAX CASES AND
OTHER CASES.
Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101, 75 L. ed. 239 (1930;
Wash.)
Goodell v. Koch, 282 U. S. 118, 75 L. ed. 247 (1930; Ariz.)
Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U. S. 122, 75 L. ed. 249 (1930;
Tex.)
Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U. S. 127, 75 L. ed. 252 (1930; La.)
United States v. Malcolm, 282 U. S. 792, 75 L. ed. 714
(1931; Calif.)
Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U. S. 264, 82 L. ed. 1331, 118
A.L.R. 319 (1938; Wash.)
In Poe v. Seaborn the court, after holding that "it is clear that
the wife has, in Washington, a vested property right in the community
property, equal with that of her husband, and in the income of the
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community, including salaries or wages of either husband or wife or
both," set for the opposing contention of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (that the management and control of the husband are
equivalent to ownership) and said:
"We think in view of the law of Washington above stated
this contention is unsound. The community must act through
an agent."
The court distinguished all the grantor and donor cases decided by
that court where the husband had technically parted with title, saying
that in those cases the husband in fact retains the ownership and all
its incidents. The court added:
"But here the husband never has ownership. That is in the
community at the moment of acquisition."
The court also said that "the powers of partners or of trustees of
a spendthrift trust furnish apt analogies."
The Supreme Court of the United States has also established that
where the state has enacted a community property system and has
given the husband the power of management and control, a subsequent
state statute taking away the power of management and control from
the husband does not deprive him of any property right. Also, con-
versely, that a state statute conferring on the husband the management
and control of community property (a power not previously possessed
by him) does not deprive the wife of her half interest in the com-
munity property. She remains the actual legal owner of that half
interest and her title is property protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
The two cases establishing these propositions are Warburton v.
White, 176 U. S. 484, 44 L. ed. 555 (a case arising in the State of
Washington and decided in 1900) and Arnett v. Reade, 220 U. S. 311,
55 L. ed. 477 (a case arising in New Mexico and decided in 1911).
Yet by the 1942 Act, Congress attempts to treat and tax as property
that which the Supreme Court holds is not property, namely, the
husband's power of management and control, and to disregard or
seriously jeopardize that which the Supreme Court holds is property,
namely, the wife's community half interest.
5. Tm MiETHOD PRESCRIBED BY TME REVENUE ACT OF 1942 FOR
TAXING COMIUNITY PROPERTY IN CASE OF THE DEATH OF Hus-
BAND OR WIFE IS SO CAPRICIOUS, ARBITRARY, DISCRIMINATORY AND
CONFISCATORY AS TO VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
FIFTH AmENDMENT.
Section 402(b) is a plain example of measuring the tax imposed
upon A by the value of B's property. The Supreme Court has con-
demned such a system as violating the due process clauses of both the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States.
1944]
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A leading case under this head is Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284
U. S. 206, where the court said:
"any attempt * * * to measure the tax on one person's
property * * * by reference to the property of another is
contrary to due process of law."
In Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (a case involving the federal
estate tax), the Court said:
"The result is that upon those who succeed to the dece-
dent's estate there is imposed the burden of a tax, measured in
part by property which comprises no part of the estate, to
which the estate is in no way related, and from which the
estate derives no benefit of any description. Plainly,
this is to measure the tax on A's property by imputing
to it in part the value of the property of B, a result which
both the Schlesinger and Hoeper cases condemn as arbitrary
and a denial of due process of law. Such an exaction is not
taxation but spoliation. 'It is not taxation that government
should take from one the profits and gains of another.
That is taxation which compels one to pay for the support
of government from his own gains and of his own property.'"
And, as aptly remarked by Judge Learned Hand in Frew v. Bowers,
12 Fed. (2d) 625, 630 (C.C.A. 2):
"Such a law is far more capricious than merely retro-
active taxes. Those do indeed impose unexpected burdens,
but at least they distribute them in accordance with the tax-
payer's wealth. But this section distributes them in accord-
ance with another's wealth; that is a far more grievous in-
justice."
Under the 1942 Amendment the tax on the community estate
varies with the total valuation of the combined separate estate of the
deceased spouse and the community estate. On account of the sliding
scale of the rate of taxation (rapidly rising with increased valuation)
the half interest in the community property owned by the surviving
spouse is not taxed at a rate depending on the value of that half
interest. On the contrary, the value of that half interest is added
to the value of the other half interest and to the value of the separate
estate of the deceased spouse and the rate accordingly rises, reaching
in many estates very high brackets. The separate property of
the surviving spouse is excluded from the valuation, but not the
separate property of the decedent, in arriving at the rate percentage
bracket.
Under the estate tax laws of both state and nation, as existing
prior to 1942, the community interest of the surviving spouse paid
no tax whatever on the death of the one first dying, because that
death effected no transfer of the survivor's half interest.
Under the arbitrary provisions of the 1942 Amendment, the sur-
vivor's half of the accumulated community property will not only be
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taxed, but will be taxed at a rate based upon the total valuation of
the combined separate estate of the decedent and the entire community
property. For this arbitrary tax a personal liability is imposed on the
survivor. This falls precisely within the case of Heimer v. Donnan,
285 U. S. 312, where the court said:
"Plainly this is to measure the tax on A's property by
imputing to it in part the value of the property of B. ***
Such an exaction is not taxation but spoliation."
Under the express terms of the 1942 Amendment, the test of owner-
ship is abolished,--as to community partnership property only,-and
there is substituted, as to the bulk of such property, the conception of
dual, but complete, ownership by both spouses, so that this bulk is
taxed as a part of the gross estate of the first to die, depending (with
the aid of a new federal statutory presumption difficult to over-
come) not on actual ownership or even on management, but on the
sheer accident of which spouse has predeceased the other. And the
rate also depends on the value of the separate property of the decedent
in which the survivor has no interest.
In analyzing this new Section 402(b) (2), it is evident that the
drafters of the act gave little study to the state community property
statutes or the state and federal court decisions interpreting them.
The language of the section is that the entire community property of
both spouses shall be included in the valuation of the (first dying)
decedent's estate "except such part thereof as may be shown to have
been received as compensation for personal services actually rendered
by the surviving spouse or derived originally from such compensation
or from separate property of the surviving spouse." Then follows
the requirement that the interest included in the gross estate of the
decedent shall not be less than the value of such part of the com-
munity property as was subject to the decedent's power of testamentary
disposition. Pretermitting for the present the requirement concerning
the power of testamentary disposition, it is to be noted that the sur-
viving spouse is given the opportunity of showing (if possible) that
some part of the community estate was "received as compensation for
personal services actually rendered by the surviving spouse." It is
evident that the word "received" is used in this section rather than
the word "acquired" or "earned" or "owned," with the idea of creating
a new kind of acquisition of property titles, namely, an acquisition
of title for federal taxing purposes different from the acquisition of
title fixed by the state community property laws.
As a matter of fact, the personal services giving rise to acquisition of
community property are personal services rendered by one spouse or the
other or both in behalf of the community partnership and the compen-
sation for those services is not received by either spouse in his separate
capacity but only as agent of the community. When in a community
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property state a husband or a wife teaches school or works in a bank
or elsewhere, the personal services are actually rendered by the com-
munity partnership and the compensation therefor is received by the
community as in the case of business partnerships. The compensation
belongs to the community (one-half to each spouse) from the very
inception of the service. As was said by the U. S. Supreme Court in
Poe v. Seaborn:
"But here the husband never has ownership. That is in the
community at the moment of acquisition."
The attempt of the drafters of the 1942 statute to create a new kind
of title to property, a sort of federal title, must fail for the reason
that the state law is absolutely controlling on the subject of acquisition
of titles to property. If, however, we give to the language of this
section the effect which its drafters probably hoped for it, it is invalid
and discriminatory and beyond the powers of Congress. It disregards
state laws, where such laws prescribe the community partnership sys-
tem, while in other parts of the federal estate tax code (applicable in all
other states) full effect is given to the state laws of the so-called
"common-law states" which define marital property rights in terms
more nearly approaching common law concepts.
Further, the clause purporting to allow the surviving spouse to
show that a part of the community property was received as compen-
sation for personal services actually rendered by the surviving spouse,
if effective at all, places upon the surviving spouse an almost impos-
sible burden in many cases, especially after long years of married
life and loss and destruction of records.
These considerations show the injustice and discriminatory effect
of attempting to create a new federal system of property titles for the
taxation of estates of married persons in disregard of state laws.
Under this act, power of testamentary disposition limits the Mini-
mum, but not the maximum, amount to be included in the gross estate,
so that it cannot be less than the amount over which the decedent had
power of testamentary disposition (one-half). But power of testa-
mentary disposition does not control, for, in most cases, property
over which the decedent had no power of testamentary disposition
is included in his or her gross estate. A shifting of management is
not made determinative, for frequently property never managed by
the decedent is required to be included in the taxable value of the
gross estate.
Another illustration of the arbitrary, discriminatory and unjust
provisions of this statute is that the federal statute exempting property
taxed for estate tax purposes in another estate within five years prior
to death is either made inoperative or is left in serious doubt as to
the community half interest of the spouse who dies later. This is true
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because the statute relating to prior taxed property, Rev. Code,
Section.812(c), permits the exclusion from the estate of any property
forming a part of the gross estate of any person who died within five
years prior to the death of the decedent only where "such property
can be identified as having been received by the decedent * * *
from a prior decedent by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance." Since
the half interest in community property belonging ..to the surviving
spouse is not received from a prior decedent "by gift, bequest, devise
or inheritance," it seems probable that even if the surviving spouse
dies within five years from the date of the death of the first decedent,
the community half interest of the surviving spouse is not protected
from double taxation. This is rank discrimination.
Thus the 1942 statute represents a curious and arbitrary inter-mix-
ture of disregard for, and regard of, state laws. The law of the
state is recognized in determining the minimum taxable estate by the
provision requiring inclusion of the value of all property over which
decedent possessed the power of testamentary disposition. The law
of the state is entirely disregarded in determining the maximum
taxable estate by the provision requiring the inclusion of the portion
of the entire community partnership property both of the decedent and
of the surviving spouse. The effect of this is only slightly modified by
the clause "except such part thereof as may be shown to have been
received as compensation for personal services actually rendered by
the surviving spouse or derived originally from such compensation or
from separate property of the surviving spouse." This clause entirely
ignores the valid state laws under which the community partnership is
created. In no other situation is the entire property of a partnership
taxable, by presumption or otherwise, to the estate of the partner first
dying, putting on the surviving partner the serious burden of proving
that he or she was the contributing cause of the accumulation.
Another discrimination results from the fact that in the administra-
tion of a community estate, claims known as community debts are
allowed as claims against the estate only to the extent of one-half
thereof. Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U. S. 764. It must be borne in
mind that the 1942 statute requires that the value of the gross com-
munity estate be included in the estate valuation for federal estate tax
purposes but leaves the administration to proceed as usual under state
laws. Under those laws only one-half of the community debts is
ordinarily deductible, a proposition expressly held by the U. S. Supreme
Court in Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U. S. 764. Revenue Code, Sec.
812(b), allows only the deduction of such claims against the estate as
are allowed by the laws of the jurisdiction under which the estate is
administered, and even this is qualified by federal limitations stated in
the section. Perhaps to avoid this rank injustice the courts might
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endeavor to find a way to permit the deduction of the full amount of
community debts from the value of the gross community estate if the
1942 Amendment is otherwise recognized as a valid enactment. But
will the court find warrant in law for so doing?
As stated in Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531:
"Under the theory advanced for the United States, the
arbitrary, whimsical and burdensome character of the chal-
lenged tax is plain enough. An excise is prescribed, but the
amount of it is made to depend on past lawful transactions
not testamentary in character and beyond recall."
It is difficult to understand how the husband's death can be said to
be an economic benefit to the wife in any sense of the word. She
loses the business manager that she voluntarily selected by the mar-
riage contract. Her husband's death is a disaster and not a benefit.
Certainly no one would suppose that a statute which undertook to
tax the estate of a trustee at his death on the value of his beneficiary's
property, or to tax the estate of an agent at his death on his
principal's property or to tax the estate of a managing partner of a
partnership at his death with his partner's interest in such partner-
ship property, comported with due process. Something more than
mere management must pass. There must be some shifting of
economic interest in the whole property to justify an estate tax
measured by the whole of that property with the addition of the
separate property of the deceased spouse. That the tax must be
measured by the shifting of real economic benefits as distinguished
from mere agency or trust powers is shown by the case of Reinecke v.
Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, where the court said:
"Nor did the reserved powers of management of the trusts
save to decedent any control over the economic benefits or
enjoyment of the property. * * * The shifting of the economic
interest in the trust property which was the subject of the tax
was thus complete as soon as the trust was made."
So, in the Wiener case, the economic interest of the wife's half was
that of the surviving spouse from the moment the property was
acquired during marriage.
The plain fact is that so far as community property states are
concerned, Congress by the 1942 Amendment has assumed the power
to substitute a sort of federal title for the property laws of the
states. It has assumed to create a federal system of property owner-
ship, based upon the question of which partner performed the services
or "received" the compensation leading to the acquisition of the
property. But even that limitation is made inoperative to the extent
that the decedent had the power of testamentary disposition. Under
the community law of the state, it is immaterial which spouse rendered
the personal services, as in other cases of partnership. If the wife
I VOL. 19
FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION
stayed at home, managed the household affairs and attended to the
needs of the children, the state law says that she contributed
equally to the acquisition of the accumulations, and by the marriage
contract the two spouses formed that kind of a business partnership
validated by the valid laws of the only sovereign empowered to legislate.
To assert the contrary, by attempting to create a he* kind of title, is
beyond the power of Congress.
As is said in deFuniak on Principles of Community Property, at
Section 54:
"There can be no more justification for Congress saying
that such an inherent principle of the law of the community
property states shall be ignored and the income considered as
separate property of the one earning it than there would be for
Congress declaring that for purposes of taxation it wil ignore
the law of non-community property states and consider all
earnings of one spouse as belonging equally to both." (Sec-
tion 255, at page 719)
6. THE PROVISION IN THE 1942 ACT PURPORTING TO PERMIT THE
SURVIVING SPOUSE TO SHow THAT HE OR SHE ACTUALLY RENDERED
THE PERSONAL SERVICES WHICH RESULTED IN THE ACCUMULATION
oF COMMUNITY PROPERTY is (1) AN ATTEMPTED AvomAcE OF
VALID STATE LAWS, AND (2) AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL ATTEMPT TO
EVADE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT BY THE CREATION OF A
PRESUMPTION.
After many years of marital relationship, it is an evident hardship
to call upon either spouse to trace through a long period of years the
relative value of his or her personal services forming their respective
contributions to the common property, which has belonged to both
spouses by legal title from its inception. Such a presumption is in-
valid as an attempt to evade the Constitution.
"A constitutional prohibition cannot be transgressed indi-
rectly by creating a statutory presumption any more than by
direct enactment." Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219; Tot v.
United States, 317 U. S. 623, 87 L. ed. 504; Manley v. Geor-
gia, 279 U. S. 1, 5-6.
Certainly, the presumption attempted by this statute that two per-
sons at the same time own in its entirety the same property is much
more capricious, arbitrary and unsupportable than the two-year pre-
sumption, declared invalid in Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312, and
even the six-year presumption invalidated in Schlesinger v. Wisconsin,
270 U. S. 230.
7. SECTION 402 (b) IS LACKING IN GEOGRAPHIC UNIFORMITY IN VIOLA-
TION OF ARTICLE I, SEC. 8, CLAUSE 1, OF THE UNITED STATES CON-
STITUTION, REQUIRING THAT ALL EXCISE TAXES BE UNIFOnR1
THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES.
This clause of the Constitution prohibits the levying of duties
imposed or excised upon a particular subject in one state, and a differ-
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ent duty imposed or excised on the same subject in another state. It
requires that whatever plan or method Congress adopts for laying
the tax in question, the same plan or method must be made operative
throughout the United States, and that wherever a subject is taxed
anywhere, the same must be taxed everywhere throughout the United
States, and at the same rate. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41.
The Federal Estate Tax Law is an excise on the privilege of passing
property at death. United States Trust Company v. Helvering, 307
U. S. 57; Landman v. Commissioner, 123 Fed. (2d) 787; Porter v.
Commissioner, 288 U. S. 436; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 56.
By its general plan the estate tax is imposed "upon the transfer
of the net estate of every decedent" (Section 810, Internal Revenue
Code) and the property subject to the tax is limited "to the extent of
the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death." (Section
811 [a]).
Thus, the federal plan (as enacted in the acts prior to 1942) is to
impose a tax upon the "transfer" of property at death, measured by
the value of the decedent's interest in such property. The "subject"
of the tax is this privilege of transfer by death. This was the "sub-
ject" of the tax in the community property partnership states until
the passage of the 1942 Amendment in question. This amendment
adopted a new plan of taxation for the community property partner-
ship states only, leaving undisturbed the original plan in all other
states.
The 1942 Amendment, by its terms, relates only to community
partnership property held "under the law" of the community property
partnership states. It has no operative effect in other states. It is
self-evident that the plan or method laid down for community
property states is not the same as the plan or method prescribed for
other states of the Union. It is likewise evident, in the express terms
of the statute, that the subject of the tax is valued and taxed differently
in these states from the method still in force for the other states of
the Union.
(a) In a 'community property partnership state the ownership of
the property is disregarded and the decedent's estate is taxed with
respect to property which he or she never owned and which he or she
could not transfer at death.
(b) It is only in the community property partnership states that
significance is given to the origin of the property. In the community
property partnership states the mere fact that the decedent performed
the services leading to the acquisition of the estate's wealth is alone
sufficient to tax the decedent on the entire property, even though at his
death he owned only a half thereof and never owned the other half.
(c) It is -only in the community partnership property states that a
presumption is adopted (often difficult to rebut under the terms of the
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statute) to the effect that a man and wife shall both be deemed at one
and the same time to be the owner of all of the same property (that
is, that both are presumed to be the owner of the other's property)
and that each is taxed on the other's property and the amount of the
tax is made to depend on the sheer accident of'which spouse may hap-
pen to die first.
(d) It is only in the community property partnership states that a
bare concession of management over property administered for an-
other is professedly made the occasion of the tax. In the other states
the death of a partner, though he be the managing partner, does not
result in the inclusion of his surviving partner's interest in. his taxable
estate, nor does the death of an agent result in taxing the principal's
property.
(e) Not only is uniformity denied because property rights (in the
surviving spouse) are subjected to the tax, while essentially identical
rights (in the surviving spouse) in non-community property states go
free; it is even more flagrantly denied in the respect that while deny-
ing reality to the wife's rights in those cases where conceding their
substantiality would result in exemption, the statute concedes their
substantiality where the concession results in additional taxation. For
example on the wife's death, her one-half of the community property
is made subject to the federal estate tax in all cases because of her
power (under state law) of testamentary disposition thereof, and the
surviving husband is not permitted to reduce the taxable valuation by
showing that all of that half (in the language of the 1942 Amend-
ment) was "received as compensation for personal services actually
rendered" by him.
The Congressional Committee report, in submitting the 1942 Reve-
nue Bill, avers that in adopting this amendment to the estate tax law,
the Congress was attempting to remove what is declared to be an ad-
vantage to the owners of estates in the community property states.
However, far from equalizing the death tax, Congress, in this amend-
ment, has seriously discriminated against the citizens of community
property states .and has made the burden of estate taxes heavier in
those states than in other states.
As the Supreme Court of Louisiana has said in the Wiener case,
14 So. (2) 475:
"It is obvious, therefore, that the wife's interest in the
community property in Louisiana does not spring from any
fiction of the law or from any gift or act of generosity on the
part of the husband, but, instead, from an express legal con-
tract of partnership entered into at the time of the marriage."
A test of discrimination is a comparison between how marital part-
ners are taxed in community property partnership states and how they
are taxed in other states. When so examined, it clearly appears that
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the 1942 Amendment did not remove, but actually created, discrimina-
tion based only on geographic location. For example, husbands and
wives in many so-called common law states may by contract voluntarily
form a partnership substantially similar to the community partnership.
In most states, the husband, by donating half of his property to his
wife, and obtaining an appointment from the wife as managing agent
of her property, brings about a legal relationship with regard to marital
property similar to the community partnership. Tracy v. Commission-
er (C. C. A. 6th Cir.), 70 Fed. (2d) 93; Verden v. Commissioner, 6 B.
T. A. 1123; Wright v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A. 21; Commerce Clear-
ing House Income Tax Service, see rulings set out in Section 1169.
(Business partnerships by husband and wife.)
The common law system of marital property rights was a barbarous
system. Every state of the Union, without exception, has made changes
to get away from those barbarities. The changes are still going on. The
common law system was grossly favorable to the husband. Every-
thing was his, including his wife. Every departure from this ancient
concept has been in the direction of increasing the wife's property rights.
Every such statutory change has diminished the property of which the
husband might die possessed; consequently, it has diminished the tax
which could be levied on his estate according to common law ownership.
The short answer to all of the claims that a special privilege has
heretofore been enjoyed by owners of estates in the community states
is that neither Congress nor any other branch of the federal government
has any power over the marital property systems in force in the various
states. Where these systems have a bearing upon the incidence of a
federal tax, the extreme limit to which any branch of the federal
government can go is to examine them as they are construed and ap-
plied by the respective state courts to determine whether the spouse
declared by state law to be the owner of property is actually such.
Where the incidence of the tax is controlled by ownership, this may
vary in the different states and cannot be called a tax advantage.
Compare Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12.
It is obvious that mathematical uniformity cannot be obtained by
having Congress, in the form of a discriminatory legislative act, dis-
regard the fundamental laws of some states of the Union and at the
same time recognize the local law of all the other states of the Union
as a guide and basis for the application of the Federal Estate Tax Law.
8. THE 1942 AMENDMENT TO THE ESTATE TAX LAW IMPOSES ON THE
SURVIVING SPOUSE A DIRECT TAX AND is, THEREFORE, VOID UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE THE TAX IS
NOT APPORTIONED AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES IN ACCORDANCE TO
POPULATION.
The third clause of Section 2 of Article I and the fourth clause of
Section 9 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States require
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that direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states accord-
ing to their respective numbers and that no direct tax shall be laid
unless in proportion to the census directed by the Constitution to be
taken.
The Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
amended those constitutional requirements, but only so far as concerns
incomes. The Sixteenth Amendment effective in 1913 authorizes
Congress to levy taxes on incomes without regard to census or enumer-
ation. It is limited to taxation of incomes. The original constitutional
provisions remain in full force and effect so far as concerns direct
taxes other than those on incomes. It was for this reason that the
Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress has no power to
tax stock dividends as income. The court said:
"It is manifest that the stock dividend in question-cannot
be reached by the Income Tax Act, and could not, even though
Congress expressly declared it to be taxable as income, unless
it is in fact income." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418.
The meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment to the effect just stated
is emphasized by the later case of Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189.
Among other things the court said in that case:
"A proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very clear
language, requires also that this Amendment shall not be
extended by loose construction, so as to repeal or modify,
except as applied to income, those provisions of the Consti-
tution that require an apportionment according to popula-
tion for direct taxes upon property, real and personal. This
limitation still has an appropriate and important function
and is not to be overridden by Congress or disregarded by
the Courts."
The limitations of this paper do not permit me to -discuss this
branch of the present question at length. Many authorities on this
point might be cited and doubtless will be cited in the briefs that
will be filed from time to time in the attacks upon the 1942 Amend-
ment. I have already pointed out that by Section 827(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code, as amended by the 1942 Act, the personal lia-
bility for the tax imposed upon the valuation of the gross community
estate is expressly imposed upon the surviving spouse who "has" on the
date of the decedent's death, property included in the gross estate, to
the extent of the value at the time of the decedent's death. It would
be hard to find an instance of a direct tax more explicit or positive
than this. The draftsmen of the Act must have overlooked the hold-
ings of the Supreme Court concerning direct taxation in the stock
dividend cases, though as late as March 1, 1943, the Supreme Court
refused to reconsider those cases. Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.'S. 371;
87 L. ed. 843. Those cases had been recognized as effective by the
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Treasury Department, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and by
Congress itself ever since their rendition approximately 24 years ago.
9. THE 1942 STATUTE CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED BY THE TYLER AND
JACOBS CASES
The Congressional Committee reports show that reliance, as to the
constitutionality of the 1942 statute, was placed upon the Tyler case,
281 U. S. 497 (Estates by Entirety), and the Jacobs case, 306 U. S.
363 (Joint Tenancy). But these cases do not support the amend-
ment. The statute involved in those cases concerned transfers by the
decedent, either mediately or immediately, to his wife or to others as a
tenant by the entirety or as a joint tenant with him. It dealt only
with property which had originally belonged to the decedent. It dealt
with such property only when the decedent in his lifetime had made a
transfer thereof by gift or without consideration, retaining the right of
survivorship attached to such estates. That particular statute was
adopted to stop loop-holes and prevent estate tax avoidance. Thus, in
the cases the Committee cited, the Court had before it merely the ques-
tion of including in the decedent's estate a gift or transfer by the
decedent, which did not ripen into completion until his death. The
transfer was to take full effect in possession and enjoyment only on
death. By gift or transfer, the decedent had created an estate which, if
his joint tenant died first, would return in full to him and which
required his prior death to confer on his transferee the full possession,
use or enjoyment of the property. Thus, the statutory provisions deal-
ing with joint tenancy and tenancy by entirety were directed at and
reached, transfers testamentary in character, in which substantial eco-
nomic rights were retained in the donor for his life. The decisions in
the Tyler and Jacobs cases are based upon grounds which do not
apply in the case of community partnership property.
1. In the Tyler and Jacobs cases, all of the property came mediately
or immediately to the tenancy as a pure gift from the decedent. Mani-
festly, this is not true of community partnership property. The char-
acter of community attaches to the property at the moment of acquisi-
tion and not because of a gift or the voluntary choice of either or both
husband and wife.
2. In the Tyler and Jacobs cases, the statute (there dealt with) was
a means appropriate to the legitimate aim of Congress of preventing
tax avoidance, in whole or in part, by inter vivos donation of the prop-
erty of one to another. This was a just basis for the decisions, but it
has not the remotest application to community partnership property.
CONCLUSION
We live in a fortunate country where power and authority are
divided between nation and state,--an indissoluble Union of indestruc-
ible states. It was so ordered by the fathers in 1787. The Congress
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of the United States has no power to legislate concerning domestic
relations. As the U. S. Supreme Court said in Smith v. Alabama,
hereinbefore quoted,
"It was in contemplation of the continued existence of
this separate system of law in each state that the Constitution
of the United States was framed and adopted."
Congress within its limited powers may enact uniform laws. Their
result upon the owners of property in many cases must vary with the
varying laws of the states. This variance is especially true when fed-
eral taxation, acts upon a relationship so definitely domestic as
marriage. It-is a principle of mathematics, as well as of law, that the
product of a constant and a variable is and must be a variable.
So- far as concerns the "take-up 80 per cent estate tax" of the
State of Washington, it is noted that the Attorney General of Wash-
ington and the Board of Governors of the Washington State Bar
Association have put on record declarations in favor of adhering to
the time-honored. community property system until it is repealed or
modified by the legislature that enacted it. Like officials in seven
other states have taken similar action.
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